go home Liberalism


Kevin MacDonald

Neil Gross and Ethan Fosse ask why professors tend to be political liberals. 2

The question is an important one. As they point out,

the occupation of being a professor is an occupation of great sociological significance. The approximately 1.4 million college or university professors and instructors working in the United States today play pivotal social roles producing new knowledge and technology; teaching and credentialing growing numbers of students; advising government, industry, and nongovernmental organizations; and shaping social narratives in what [Jeffrey] Alexander (2006)3 calls the “civil sphere.” Politics do not bear directly on all work professors do, but higher education institutions as loci of knowledge production and dissemination may be influenced in important ways by their political views. 4

At least since the 19th century, the way we see ourselves has been vitally shaped by the academic community. Contemporary views on issues like race, gender, immigration, and a host of vital issues originate in the academy, are disseminated throughout the media, and ultimately are consumed by the educated and not-so-educated public. Newspaper articles and television programs on these issues routinely include quotes from academic experts — especially professors from elite institutions.

Gross and Fosse point to recent surveys for social science faculty showing ratios of 7:1 to 9:1 favoring Democrats to Republicans. Thus Rothman, Lichter, and Nevitte (2005) found that 50% of faculty identified themselves as Democrats, compared to only 11% Republican; in general there was “an across the board commitment to positions that are typically identified with contemporary liberal ideals.”5 In their study, Gross and Fosse find that “the difference in political self-identity between professors and other Americans is over 1.5 times that between blacks and whites ..., over twice as great as that between the bottom and top deciles in constant household income ..., and more than seven times larger than that between women and men . “6

In examining why this might be, Gross and Fosse found that the most powerful variable was simply having a graduate degree — results they argue are not due to IQ. That is, college professors are liberals because they went to grad school, and they did so not because they were smarter, but for some other reason. The second strongest predictor was “intellectualism” — the extent of tolerance for controversial ideas. The next most powerful predictor was religious affiliation or lack thereof: People with no religious affiliation, or Jewish affiliation, or non-conservative Protestant affiliation were more likely to be liberal (in that order). Since it’s likely that a considerable percentage of professors who declare themselves as having no religious affiliation are Jews, this doubtless underrepresents the importance of Jewishness in accounting for professorial liberalism. (In general, the study would have been far better if race and Jewish ethnic background were included as variables rather than simply religious affiliation.)

Gross and Fosse acknowledge that their data can be interpreted in a number of ways. However, they argue that “the liberalism of professors is a function ... of the systematic sorting of young adults who are already liberally- or conservatively-inclined into and out of the academic profession, respectively.”7 Just as a profession like nursing becomes typecast as appropriate for women, becoming a professor is seen as appropriate for liberals: “We argue that the professoriate, along with a number of other knowledge work fields, has been ‘politically typed’ as appropriate for and welcoming of people with broadly liberal political sensibilities, and as inappropriate for conservatives.”8

This self-sorting process likely accounts for my original attraction to the academic world while I was a political radical.9 With my current beliefs, it would be suicide to embark on an academic career in the realization that one would have to dissemble all through graduate school and at least up until the granting of tenure, never able to express my real attitudes. (Yet, that is exactly the position of a number of graduate students and young faculty who have contacted me over the years.) A recent study, completed after Gross and Fosse’s paper, indicates that liberal faculty members acknowledged being willing to discriminate against conservative job candidates, and that this tendency became stronger among the most liberal faculty.10 Even after tenure, one doesn’t want to remain an associate professor for the rest of one’s career. Promotion would be impossible for anyone who came out as a conservative, much less someone like me who believes in the importance of ethnic genetic interests, ending legal and illegal immigration, the role of Jewish influence in shaping elite political and cultural attitudes, etc.

Even full professors at many institutions would think twice about espousing conservative views. They would stop being invited to parties and they would find they have many fewer friends. They could forget about obtaining federal grants or receiving financial or other types of support from the un iversity, and they could even see their salary drop, since at many institutions the department chair or a committee has power over their salary. Gross and Fosse note that, “when it occasionally happens that conservative students do form the aspiration to become professors, they are likely to run up against barriers involving both self-concept incongruence and negative judgments from peers and occupation members.”11

I recall that when I had become a Reagan-type mainstream conservative, somewhere in the early 1980s, going to a academic gatherings became an experience in dissembling — forced smiles at anti-Reagan jokes uttered with absolute confidence that everyone would join in the fun. There is an absolute certainty that all conservatives have two-digit IQ’s and are infinitely inferior to them intellectually. They also believe that conservatives suffer from severe psychiatric disorders. Conservatives speak with a Southern accent, drive pickup trucks, are fond of guns, and are filled with irrational hatreds. Or they are snooty capitalists who exploit minorities, attend exclusive country clubs, and have retrograde attitudes on race and homosexuality.

Typical academics have internalized the attitudes that have come to dominate the Western intellectual scene. The assumption of ideological homogeneity is stifling — some kinds of diversity are simply out of bounds in an academic environment — even mainstream conservatism. Based on my experience, coming out as a non-liberal is guaranteed to result in “negative judgments from peers and occupation members.”12 A conservative professor is not exactly an oxymoron, but a mainstream conservative — and certainly an evolutionary psychologist who believes that White people have ethnic genetic interests — is certain to be regarded with moral revulsion by pretty much all the people he works with.

The theory of Gross and Fosse is not primarily an attempt to explain how academia became a bastion of the left. Rather, it explains how at least since the 1970s, those who entered academia selected an environment that fit with their beliefs. The problem I have working in an academic environment is that my beliefs evolved from my days as a 1960s radical, so that I no longer fit into the world that I once admired.


How did the academic world become so radically tilted to the left? Gross and Fosse have some ideas on this as well. Disciplines construct images of the ideal person in their respective fields, and these images are ultimately the result of conflict among competing images. When it comes to understanding the history of how the academy became a bastion of the left, they emphasize the 1960s and the conservative reaction against it. It was during this period that the image of the radical leftist professor replaced the image of the Ivory Tower professor — the unworldly person of letters and sophistication, at home with his books, his pipe, and his tweed jacket, and totally immersed in discussions of renaissance poetry or the art of classical antiquity.

Universities were relatively liberal before the 1960s — at least since the decline of Darwinism in the social sciences by 1930. As I have argued, the decline of Darwinian social science (perhaps ‘eradication’ is a better word) resulted in an intellectual gap that was quickly filled by several Jewish-dominated intellectual movements of the left.13

Nevertheless, there was a major shift in the 1960s that resulted in the activist left becoming dominant at American universities. Perhaps the most important aspect of this shift was that before the 1960s liberalism was identified with supporting unions and other institutions aimed at improving the lot of working class Whites. By the 1960s, the left’s abandonment of the White working class in favor of multiculturalism, mass non-White immigration, the interests of non-White racial and ethnic minorities, and sexual non-conformity was well under way. Indeed, it is well known that the Jewish intellectual movements that came to dominate the left — perhaps most notably the Frankfurt School — eventually abandoned the working class because they were insufficiently radical and had succumbed to fascism in Germany and Italy.14

This caused them to reject orthodox Marxism. Their solution, ultimately, was massive non-White immigration and multiculturalism, as well as recruiting Whites who had complaints against the traditional culture, particularly feminists and sexual minorities. This has resulted in a very potent and perhaps lethal combination of interests opposed to the traditional people and culture of Western societies. As Gross and Fosse note, it was during the 1960s when the universities became strongly associated with the political left in the eyes of friends and foes alike — enough to result in self-selection processes in which conservatives would feel unwelcome in the university:

Higher education was a crucial micromobilization context for a number of left social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, which further enhanced the institution’s liberal reputation; with concerted cultural efforts by American conservatives, especially from the 1950s on, to build a collective identity for their movement around differentiation from various categories of “liberal elites,” not least liberal professors; with restricted opportunities for Americans on the far left to enter other institutional spheres; and with self-reinforcing processes by which self-selection into the academic profession by liberals resulted in a more liberal professoriate whose reputation for liberalism was thereby maintained or enhanced.15

Further, because elite universities attempt to most represent the zeitgeist of the field, Gross and Fosse point out they will offer positions to scholars they see as exemplary, and political attitudes as are a major part of being exemplary. Imagine the extreme improbability of being hired in a women’s studies department as an openly declared conservative heterosexual — especially at an elite institution.

I would also add that not only are liberal attitudes a key component of being seen as a viable job candidate at an elite institution, group membership is critical. Being a non-White or a member of a sexual minority definitely gives one a leg up in the hiring process, as well as promotion and the prospect of becoming an administrator. Since the contemporary zeitgeist celebrates the multicultural left (as opposed to the pro-White working class left of the pre-1960s), that means hiring those who espouse the most liberal attitudes, and especially those from aggrieved groups as imagined by the multicultural left. And, as Gross and Fosse point out, this in turn leads to elite institutions being to the left of lesser institutions. In the academic food chain, the result is that graduate students coming from elite institutions are most representative of the leftist academic culture, either because of their socialization in the academic environment or simply because of self-interest as in a victimized minority championed by the
left. This becomes progressively diluted as one goes to the second- and third-tier schools and eventually down to K–12 education.

This creates a liberal social environment at all levels of the academic food chain. Public opinion surveys carried out since the 1960s show that going to college results in attitude change in a liberal direction compared to parents. If education level remained the same, there was little change in attitudes. 16

Thus, for all its espousal of egalitarianism, the academic world is a top-down system in which the highest levels are rigorously policed to ensure ideological conformity, not only for the reasons suggested by Gross and Fosse, but also because any leak in the system would mean that non-conformists would benefit from institutional prestige. This, of course, is exactly why John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, authors of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, caused such a panic attack in the ranks of the Israel Lobby. Mearsheimer and Walt weren’t just two easy-to-ignore professors from a third-tier institution; nor were they members of an easily marginalized group. They were well-known and academically productive professors from prestigious institutions — the University of Chicago and Harvard respectively.

This resulted in a full-fledged smear campaign improbably emphasizing “shoddy scholarship” — improbable given their long history of publishing their research in major academic journals. This charge was typically made by Jewish activist organizations or others without the least experience as scholars. Mearsheimer and Walt were also charged with the thought crime of anti-Semitism and were often compared with the authors of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion — also improbable given that they are political liberals who have bent over backwards not to offend Jews. 17

Nevertheless, despite their lack of credibility, these efforts have been at least somewhat successful, in the short term at least. Politicians are loath to cite Mearsheimer and Walt, and it is unthinkable that they could attain positions in the government where they could directly influence US foreign policy. This shows that even elite academics can be marginalized if they come up against powerful interests. But the energy expended by the Jewish activist community against Mearsheimer and Walt shows the danger that elite academics pose to those who disagree with the implications of their ideas.

Another example is E. O. Wilson, the Harvard biologist who in 1975 stunned the academic left with the publication of
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Wilson included a chapter applying evolutionary thinking to humans — a topic that had been expunged from the social sciences ever since the triumph of Boasian anthropology in the 1920s. Wilson was already well-known as an entomologist and ecologist, and his position as a senior professor at Harvard gave him immense authority.

The left went into full-fledged moral panic mode, led by Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould.18 Both Lewontin and Gould were also at Harvard and were discussed in Chapter 2 of The Culture of Critique as examples of leftist Jewish intellectuals who undermined evolutionary and biological approaches in the social sciences.19 As Wilson noted, “without Lewontin, the [sociobiology] controversy would not have been so intense or attracted such widespread attention.”20


The major question for me is whether the theory of Gross and Fosse is compatible with my proposal in The Culture of Critique 21 that Jewish intellectual movements were a critical force in producing the leftist political culture in the academic world and beyond? I think the answer is a resounding “yes.”

Gross and Fosse propose a conflict theory of successful intellectual movements. In particular, they cite sociological research indicating that successful intellectual movements have three key ingredients.22 (1) They begin with people with high-status positions having complaints against the current environment, resulting in conflict with the status quo. (2) These intellectuals form cohesive and cooperative networks. (3) This network has access to prestigious institutions and publication outlets.

This is precisely the perspective developed in The Culture of Critique (a citation would have been nice). In the following, I provide evidence for four propositions which together suffice to show that, as argued in The Culture of Critique, “Jewish-dominated intellectual movements were a critical factor (necessary condition) for the triumph of the intellectual left in late twentieth-century Western societies” (p. 16).

Before embarking on that, it is noteworthy that Gross and Fosse are at least somewhat cognizant of the importance of Jewish influence. They deem it relevant to point out that Jews entered the academic world in large numbers after WWII and became over-represented among professors, especially in elite academic departments in the social sciences — that is, in the decade immediately prior to the triumph of the multicultural left in the academic world. They cite recent survey data indicating that 25% of the faculty at research universities are Jewish compared to 10% overall; these percentages are even higher in departments of social science at research universities.23 Correspondingly, conservative Protestants are under-represented, especially among faculty of elite research universities. Further, and importantly, as noted above, the most liberal professors work at the most elite institutions — a point to be returned to below.

These findings regarding Jewish over-representation replicate similar findings based on surveys in the 1970s. They also fit well with the views of other social scientists. For example, David Hollinger calls attention to “a secular, increasingly Jewish, decidedly left-of-center intelligentsia based largely but not exclusively in the disciplinary communities of philosophy and the social sciences.”24 He notes “the transformation of the ethnoreligious demography of American academic life by Jews” in the period from the 1930s to the 1960s, as well as the Jewish influence on trends toward the secularization of American society and in advancing an ideal of cosmopolitanism.25

In anthropology, the triumph of the Boas resulted in the domination of anthropology of his students, the great majority of whom were Jewish. By 1915 the Boasians controlled the American Anthropological Association and held a two-thirds majority on its Executive Board.26

By 1926 every major department of anthropology was headed by Boas’s students, the majority of whom were Jewish. Boas’s protégé, anthropologist Melville Herskovits, noted that

the four decades of the tenure of [Boas’s] professorship at Columbia gave a continuity to his teaching that permitted him to develop students who eventually made up the greater part of the significant professional core of American anthropologists, and who came to man and direct most of the major departments of anthropology in the United States. In their turn, they trained the students who . . . have continue d the tradition in which their teachers were trained.27

In the post–World War II period, Irving Louis Horowitz notes that sociology “became populated by Jews to such a degree that jokes abounded: one did not need the synagogue, the minyan [i.e., the minimum number of Jews required for a communal religious service] was to be found in sociology departments; or, one did not need a sociology of Jewish life, since the two had become synonymous.”28

Moreover, during the critical era of the 1960s when academia was transformed in the direction of the multicultural left, cohesive groups of Jews formed subgroups within academic associations (e.g., the Boasian program within the America n Anthropological Association; psychoanalysis within the America n Psychiatric Association). The Caucus for a New Politics of the American Political Science Association was “overwhelmingly Jewish” and that the Union of Radical Political Economists was initially disproportionately Jewish.29

Jews formed and dominated cohesive subgroups with a radical political agenda in several academic societies in the 1960s, including professional associations in economics, political science, sociology, history, and the Modern Language Association.30 There was a broad political agenda of Jewish social scientists during this period:

We have already pointed out the weaknesses of some of these studies [on Jewish involvement in radical political movements]. We suspect that many of the ‘truths’ established in other areas of the social sciences during this period suffer from similar weaknesses. Their widespread acceptance . . . may have had as much to do with the changing ethnic and ideological characteristics of those who dominated the social science community as they did with any real advance in knowledge.31


Gross and Fosse also correctly point out that Jews in general are politically liberal. Indeed, Norman Podhoretz recently published a book titled Why are Jews Liberals?32 For example, over 80% of Jews voted for Obama — far higher than any other religious or ethnic group, except Blacks. Moreover, the Jewish voting profile in terms of income and occupation is completely different from other liberal voters — the old saw that Jews “earn like Episcopalians and vote like Puerto Ricans.” Whereas the views of Jewish professors are quite in line with the views of the wider Jewish community, the views of non-Jewish White professors are quite out of step with the wider White community.

Thus the liberalism of Jewish professors is entirely in line with the attitudes of other Jews, and it is at least doubtful th at the reasons why Jewish professors are liberal are any different from why most Jews are liberal — that is, the liberal proclivities of Jews are a fundamental facet of Jewish identity in the Diaspora in 20th-century Western societies. This means that the deeper motivation for the liberalism of a very significant percentage of faculty at elite universities, especially in departments of social sciences and humanities, is not really addressed in this study. The following therefore assumes that the motivations of Jewish professors is motivated by the same forces as the liberalism as a general Jewish ideology in the Western Diaspora and the same as the motivations of the principal figures in the Jewish intellectual movements covered in The Culture of Critique.

1) Jewish intellectuals have a complaint. Gross and Fosse propose that successful intellectual movements begin with a complaint, and there can be little doubt that Jews in general have a complaint — two related complaints actually: The long history of anti-semitism and the predominance of White Christian culture.

Podhoretz’s book is typical of a very large literature that points to the lachrymose view of Jewish history as influencing how Jews see themselves politically in Diaspora societies in the West. The lachrymose view of Jewish history proposes that, beginning with an unfortunate theological belief (that Jews killed God), Jews in Western societies have repeatedly been passive, innocent victims of marauding non-Jews. As I noted in Separation and Its Discontents:

Jewish religious consciousness centers to a remarkable extent around the memory of persecution. Persecution is a central theme of the holidays of Passover, Hanukkah, Purim, and Yom Kippur. ... Jews learn about the Middle Ages as a period of persecution in Christian Europe, culminating in the expulsions and the Inquisitions. The massacres perpetrated by the Crusaders in 1096 in Germany became a central event in Jewish consciousness. ... Detailed lists of martyrs were composed and recited in synagogue ritual for hundreds of years after the event; chronicles of the event were written an d a literature on the status of forced converts was developed .... There is also a strong awareness of the persecutions in Eastern Europe, especially the czarist persecutions. Indeed, the historian Sir Louis B. Namier went so far as to say that there was no Jewish history, “only a Jewish martyrology” .... When prominent social scientist Michael Walzer ... states that “I was taught Jewish history as a long tale of exile and persecution—Holocaust history read backwards,” he is expressing not only the predominant perception of Jews of their own history but also a powerful strand of academic Jewish historiography, the so-called “lachrymose” tradition of Jewish historiography.33

The lesson that Jews learned from the Middle Ages carries down to today: Podhoretz notes that the Jews “emerged from the Middle Ages knowing for a certainty that — individual exceptions duly noted — the worst enemy they had in the world was Christianity: the churches in which it was embodied — whether Roman Catholic or Russian Orthodox or Protestant — and the people who prayed in and were shaped by them. It was a knowledge that Jewish experience in the ages to come would do very little, if indeed anything at all, to help future generations to forget.”34

Jews therefore hate all manifestations of Christianity. But the demise of Christianity as the central intellectual paradigm didn’t improve things for Jews. During the Enlightenment, anti-Jewish ideologies smoothly morphed into non-theological views in which Judaism was a superstitious relic that prevented Jews from shedding their attachment to their people — “giving up their sense of themselves as a people whose members were bound together across national boundaries wherever they might live.”35

The Enlightenment critique of Judaism implied that Jews should give up their tribal allegiances and economic and political networks and that they should accept the atomized individualism implied by the modern nation state. As Count Clermont-Tonnere expressed it in addressing the French National Assembly in 1789, “The Jews should be denied everything as a nation, but granted everything as individuals. ... The existence of a nation with in a nation is unacceptable to our country.”36

In the 19th century, Jews began to be seen by their enemies as an economically successful alien race intent on subverting national cultures wherever they lived. Podhoretz points to “the new racist rationale [that] manifested itself in the portrayal of a war between Aryans and Semites as the central drama of history.”37 For example, Ivan Aksakov, a leader of Slavophiles in Russia, viewed Jews as a competitive threat intent on destroying Christianity: “The Western European Christian world will be faced in the future, in one form or another, with a life-and-death struggle with Jewry, which is striving to replace the universal Christian ideal by another, Semitic ideal, also universal, but negative and anti-Christian.”38

Even in the United States — the “golden land” as seen by Jewish immigrants — there was exclusion and antipathy from “the upper echelons of the Wasp patriciate.”39 In America, Jews were excluded by WASP elites, and Christian forms of anti-Semitism (e.g., Father Coughlin) remained strong through the 1930s. Isolationists such as Charles Lindbergh also tended to see Jews as an interest group aiming at getting America involved in war with Germany. Jews concluded, as they had ever since the political left and right came to be defined, that their enemies were on the right. But the main lesson Podhoretz and a legion of other Jewish intellectuals have drawn is that over the centuries Western intellectuals produced a variety of Christian and non-Christian anti-Jewish ideologies, each with the same result: Irrational hatred toward Jews. So it’s not just Christianity, but European civilization itself that is the problem for Jews. And, although Podhoretz doesn’t explicitly make this move, it’s a very short jump from blaming the culture created and sustained by Europeans to the idea that Europeans as a people or group of peoples are the problem. Ultimately, this implicit sense that Europeans themselves are the problem is the crux of the Jewish complaint. This Jewish complaint has resonated powerfully among Jewish intellectuals who rose to the heights of the academic world.

The Culture of Critique begins by emphasizing that Jewish intellectuals were generally estranged from and hostile toward Western culture and institutions, quoting the important work of John Murray Cuddihy:

From Solomon Maimon to Normon Podhoretz, from Rachel Varnhagen to Cynthia Ozick, from Marx and Lassalle to Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel, from Herzl and Freud to Harold Laski and Lionel Trilling, from Moses Mendelssohn to J. Robert Oppenheimer and Ayn Rand, Gertrude Stein, and Reich I and II (Wilhelm and Charles), one dominating structure of an identical predicament and a shared fate imposes itself upon the consciousness and behavior of the Jewish intellectual in Galut [exile]: with the advent of Jewish Emancipation, when ghetto walls crumble and the shtetlach [small Jewish towns] begin to dissolve, Jewry—like some wide-eyed anthropologist—enters upon a strange world, to explore a strange people observing a strange halakah (code). They examine this world in dismay, with wonder, anger, and punitive objectivity. This wonder, this anger, and the vindictive objectivity of the marginal nonmember are recidivist; they continue unabated into our own time because Jewish Emancipation continues into our own time.40

The various chapters of Culture of Critique show that hostility to the people and culture of West was characteristic of all the Jewish intellectual and political movements of the left that came to be ensconced in the academic world of the United States and other Western societies. For example, Franz Boas’s cultural relativism (which implied that Western societies were in no way more advanced or superior to other societies) came to dominate academic anthropology. Boas had a strong sense that anti-Semitism pervaded non-Jewish society, leading him to despise non-Jewish culture, particularly the culture of the Prussian aristocracy in his native Germany.41

Charles Liebman’s theory of Jewish involvement in the left emphasizes the idea that leftist universalist ideology allows Jews to subvert traditional social categorizations in which Jews are viewed in negative terms.42 The adoption of such ideologies by Jews is an attempt to overcome Jewish feelings of alienation “from the roots and the traditions of [non-Jewish] society.”43

The Jew continues his search for an ethic or ethos which is not only universal or capable of universality, but which provides a cutting edge against the older traditions of the society, a search whose intensity is compounded and reinforced by the Gentile’s treatment of the Jew.44

Estrangement and hostility toward non-Jews and their culture was typical of Freud and other prominent Jewish psychoanalysts — motivated at least partly by their perception of anti-Semitism. Yerushalmi notes “We find in Freud a sense of otherness vis-à-vis non-Jews which cannot be explained merely as a reaction to anti-Semitism.Though anti-Semitism would periodically reinforce or modify it, this feeling seems to have been primal, inherited from his family and early milieu, and it remained with him throughout his life.”45

Freud’s viewed European culture as something to be conquered in the interest of leading humanity to a higher moral level and ending anti-Semitism. Freud had a sense of “Jewish moral superiority to the injustices of an intolerant, inhumane—indeed, anti-Semitic—society.”46 He wrote of his messianic hope to achieve the “integration of Jews and anti-Semites on the soil of [psychoanalysis]” a quote clear-ly indicating that psychoanalysis was viewed by its founder as a mechanism for ending anti-Semitism.47

Given the complaint that so many of Freud’s followers had about Western society, it is not surprising that it was used to produce theories in which anti-Semitism is attributed to intrapsychic conflict, sexual repressions, and troubled parent-child relationships while also denying the importance of cultural separatism and the reality of group-based competition for resources. The Frankfurt School’s theory is a great example.

At the heart of the Frankfurt School ideology was a complaint about historical anti-Semitism in Western societies. Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment interprets all of Western history, from Christianity in the ancient world to 20th-century fascism, as resulting from the suppression of nature, whereas Judaism is seen as a natural (and therefore good) religion. Anti-Semitism results from envy of the characteristics of Jews.

The New York Intellectuals were also motivated by the complaint of anti-Semitism. For example, in 1949 there was a conflict between the nascent Jewish intellectual establishment and the older, predomi-nantly WASP literary establishment over the issue of an award to Ezra Pound, whose poetry reflected his fascist sympathies and his anti-Semitism. Influential art critic Clement Greenberg emphasized the priority of the moral over the aesthetic in making such judgments, writing that “life includes and is more important than art and it judges things by their consequences. . . . As a Jew, I myself cannot help being offended by the matter of Pound’s latest poetry; and since 1943 things like that make me feel physically afraid too.”48

Another example is Sidney Hook, a leader of the New York Intellectuals and an academic philosopher at New York University. For Hook, the sources of anti-Semitism are to be found “in the beliefs and habits and culture of the non-Jews,” particularly Christianity.49 Anti-Semitism “is endemic to every Christian culture whose religions made Jews the eternal villain in the Christian drama of salvation.”50 Their complaint against American culture as anti-Semitic ultimately shaped their theories. The New York Intellectuals associated rural America with

nativism, anti-Semitism, nationalism, and fascism as well as with anti-intellectualism and provincialism; the urban was associated antithetically with ethnic and cultural tolerance, with internationalism, and with advanced ideas. . . . The New York Intellectuals simply began with the assumption that the rural—with which they associated much of American tradition and most of the territory beyond New York—had little to contribute to a cosmopolitan culture. . . . By interpreting cultural and political issues through the urban-rural lens, writers could even mask assertions of superiority and expressions of anti-democratic sentiments as the judgments of an objective expertise.51

Jewish involvement in shaping US immigration policy was also motivated by two different complaints about non-Jewish society: the familiar complaint of anti-Semitism, but also the complaint that models of the US as a homogeneous White, Christian civilization excluded Jews. For example, Earl Raab, a Jewish sociologist affiliated with Brandeis University and a collaborator of Seymour Martin Lipset who held positions several elite universities (Stanford, Harvard, Columbia, and UC-Berkeley), remarked very positively on the success of American immigration policy in lessening the prospects of anti-Semitism.

Raab acknowledged that te Jewish community had played a leadership role in changing the Northwestern European bias of American immigration policy, and he has also maintained that one factor inhibiting anti-Semitism in the contemporary United States is that “an increasing ethnic heterogeneity, as a result of immigration, has made it even more difficult for a political party or mass movement of bigotry to develop.”52

Jewish social scientists were also motivated by the complaint that Jews were excluded from the US as a White, Christian culture. Horace Kallen, an academic philosopher, developed the theory of cultural pluralism as a model for the United States — a model that simultaneously undermines the primacy of the traditional culture of the US while at the same time rationalizing the continuity of Jewish culture. Kallen’s 1915 book, Democracy versus the Melting Pot, was aimed at legitimizing immigration and was opposed the ideas of Edward A. Ross, a Darwinian sociologist at the University of Wisconsin. Kallen’s theory of cultural pluralism became a bedrock ideology among American Jews, certainly including Jewish academics:

Legitimizing the preservation of a minority culture in the midst of a majority’s host society, pluralism functioned as intellectual anchorage for an educated Jewish second generation, sustained its cohesiveness and its most tenacious communal endeavors through the rigors of the Depression and revived anti-semitism, through the shock of Nazism and the Holocaust, until the emergence of Zionism in the post–World War II years swept through American Jewry with a climactic redemptionist fervor of its own.53

The Jewish complaint about cultural exclusion is also reflected in the immigration debates of the 1920s. Boasian anthropology had ascended to the academic heights by the mid-1920s. Boas’s professional correspondence “reveals that an important motive behind his famous head-measuring project in 1910 was his strong personal interest in keeping the United States diverse in population.”54

By the time of the final victory in 1965, which removed national origins and racial ancestry from immigration policy and opened up immigration to all human groups, the Boasian perspective of cultural determinism and antibiologism had become standard academic wisdom. The result was that “it became intellectually fashionable to discount the very existence of persistent ethnic differences. The whole reaction deprived popular race feelings of a powerful ideological weapon.”55

Boas’s protégé Ashley Montagu, a professor of Anthropology at Rutgers, was perhaps the most visible opponent of the concept of race in the period following World War II. Montagu, whose original name was Israel Ehrenberg, theorized that humans are innately cooperative, but not innately aggressive; there is a universal brotherhood among humans and no biologically based differences between the races in abilities.56

An article by Oscar Handlin, the prominent Harvard historian of immigration, illustrates a version of the complaint by Jewish academics that they were excluded from being true Americans — that the immigration laws in force since 1924 that had resulted in an ethnic status quo implying that Jews and other non-Northwestern Europeans were inferior:

The laws are bad because they rest on the racist assumption that mankind is divided into fixed breeds, biologically and culturally separated from each other, and because, within that framework, they assume that Americans are Anglo-Saxons by origin and ought to remain so. To all other peoples, the laws say that the United States ranks them in terms of their racial proximity to our own ‘superior’ stock; and upon the many, many millions of Americans not descended from the Anglo-Saxons, the laws cast a distinct imputation of inferiority.57
In his highly acclaimed America as a Civilization, Max Lerner, who taught at several elite universities (including Harvard), provides yet another example of the complaint among Jews with prominent positions in the academic world against the culture of the United States. Lerner finds the United States to be a tribalistic nation with a “passionate rejection of the ‘outsider’” and he asserts that “with the passing of the [1924 immigration] quota laws racism came of age in America.”58

Lerner laments the fact that these “racist” laws are still in place because of popular sentiment, “whatever the intellectuals may think.” This is clearly a complaint that when it came to immigration policy, Americans were not following the lead of the predominantly Jewish urbanized intellectual elite represented by Lerner. The comment reflects the anti-democratic, anti-populist element of Jewish intellectual activity discussed elsewhere in Culture of Critique.

Finally, although mainly involved in proactive support of Israel, the complaint of anti-Semitism was also a motivation for neoconservatives. (I include neocons as liberals because their policies on domestic social issues are either liberal [particularly with regard to issues like immigration] or they are positions of convenience designed to develop coalitions within the Republican Party.59) An academic observer of the neocons noted that

As they saw it, the world was gravely threatened by a totalitarian Soviet Union with aggressive outposts around the world and a Third World corrupted by vicious anti-Semitism. ... By the mid-1970s, Israel was also under fire from the Soviet Union and the Third World and much of the West. The United States was the one exception, and the neoconservatives— stressing that Israel was a just, democratic state constantly threatened by vicious and aggressive neighbors—sought to deepen and strengthen this support.60

Ruth Wisse, who is the Martin Peretz Professor of Yiddish literature and a professor of Comparative Literature at Harvard, wrote a classic 1981 Commentary article “The Delegitimation of Israel” in which she views hostility toward Israel as another example of the long history of anti-Semitism. This tradition is said to have begun with the Christian beliefs that Jews ought to be relegated to an inferior position because they had rejected Christ. It culminated in twentieth-century Europe in hatred directed at secular Jews because of their failure to assimilate completely to European culture. The result was the Holocaust, which was “from the standpoint of its perpetrators and collaborators successful beyond belief.”61

Many neocons, particularly those like Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz who were centered around Senator Henry Jackson, were also motivated by perceived anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. In summary, there is good evidence that the Jewish intellectuals who were involved in important intellectual movements of the left that came to dominate academic discourse were motivated by complaints — mainly complaints of anti-Semitism but also complaints of cultural exclusion from White, Christian society. Finally, it should also by noted that Gross and Fosse point out that “studies of professorial politics that go beyond self-identification show that while professors do have more liberal economic attitudes than other Americans, it is their social attitudes that are truly distinctive ... —for example, their views of gender, homosexuality, abortion, and so on.”

This is also the case with Jews generally. For example, the difference between the largely Jewish Hollywood elite and both the traditional elites and the general public is clearest on “expressive individualism”—a dimension tapping ideas of sexual liberation (including approval of homosexuality), moral relativism, and a disdain for religious institutions.62

The movie elite is also more tolerant of unusual or deviant lifestyles and of minority religions and ethnic groups. Survey data repeatedly shows that the Jewish community in general has more liberal attitudes on issues related to sexuality and church state-separation.63

The following is a passage from The Culture of Critique summarizing the cohesion of Jewish intellectual networks discussed in the rest of the book:

An important thread apparent in the discussions of psychoanalysis, Boasian anthropology, the Frankfurt School, and radical intellectual and political circles has been that Jewish intellectuals have formed highly cohesive groups whose influence derives to great extent from the solidarity and cohesiveness of the group. ... Intellectual activity is like any other human endeavor: Cohesive groups outcompete individualist strategies. Indeed, the fundamental truth of this axiom has been central to the success of Judaism throughout its history.64

I have already noted that cohesive groups of politically radical Jews formed subgroups within academic associations in the social sciences beginning in the 1960s. These subgroups functioned to not only promote leftist ideologies, but also as ethnic networks that promoted their members as paragons of academic wisdom.

The New York Intellectuals, many of whom ended up at elite universities for part of their careers, also illustrate this point. They spent their lives within a Jewish social and intellectual milieu. When Florence Rubenfeld lists the people Clement Greenberg invited to social occasions at his apartment in New York, the only non-Jew mentioned is artist William de Kooning.65 Dwight Macdonald stood out because he was not Jewish — “a distinguished goy among the Partisanskies” as Michael Wrezin had it.66

Norman Podhoretz refers to the New York Intellectuals as a “family” who, when they attended a party, arrived at the same time and socialized among their ingroup. It was an insular world in which the only people who even existed were ingroup members: “The family paid virtually no heed to anyone outside it except kissing cousins. . . . To be adopted into the family was a mark of great distinction: it meant you were good enough, that you existed as a writer and an intellectual.”67

Many of the New York Intellectuals eventually moved in the direction of neoconservatism, but here too there were cohesive, effective networks. Paul Gottfried points out that the disciples of Leo Strauss have developed their own publishing and reviewing network, including neoconservative publications, the Basic Books publishing house, and the university presses at Cornell University, Johns Hopkins Uni-versity, and the University of Chicago.68

Among this self-described alienated and marginalized group there was also an atmosphere of social support that undoubtedly functioned as had traditional Jewish ingroup solidarity arrayed against an outside world seen as morally and intellectually inferior. They perceived themselves as people with a complaint who must cling together against the forces of evil — “rebel intellectuals defending a minority position and upholding the best traditions of radicalism.”69

Their flagship journal, Partisan Review, provided “a haven and support” and a sense of social identity; it “served to assure many of its members that they were not alone in the world, that sympathetic intellectuals existed in sufficient number to provide them with social and profes-sional moorings.”70

There was thus a great deal of continuity to this “coherent, distinguishable group” of intellectuals “who mainly began
their careers as revolutionary communists in the 1930s [to] become an institutionalized and even hegemonic component of American culture during the conservative 1950s while maintaining a high degree of collective continuity.”71

Another aspect of the cohesiveness of academic Jews is their cita-tion patterns. Greenwald and Schuh showed that Jewish professors were 40 percent more likely to cite other Jews than were non-Jewish professors.72 Jewish first authors of scientific papers were also approximately three times more likely to have Jewish coauthors than were non-Jewish first authors. This imbalance in co-authors shows Jewish group cohesion — Jewish professors having Jewish students as protégés.

Citation by other scientists is an important indication of scholarly accomplishment and is often a key measure used in tenure decisions by universities. As a result, Jewish ethnic biases in citation patterns have the effect of promoting the work and reputation of other Jewish scientists and making it easier to get tenure at elite universities. Providing further evidence in this regard, the studies by Kadushin,73 Shapiro, 74 and Torrey 75 of twentieth-century American intellectuals indicate not only a strong overlap among Jewish background, Jewish ethnic identification, Jewish associational patterns, radical political beliefs, and psychoanalytic influence bu also a pattern of mutual citation and admiration. In Kadushin’s study, almost half of the complete sample of elite American intellectuals were Jewish. The sample was based on the most frequent contributors to leading intellectual jour-nals, followed by interviews in which the intellectuals “voted” for an-other intellectual whom he or she considered most influential in their thinking. Over 40 percent of the Jews in the sample received six or more votes as being most influential, compared to only 15 percent of non-Jews.

Also contributing to cohesion has been the tendency to center around charismatic leaders (Boas, Freud, Horkheimer) with a powerful moral, intellectual, and social vision. The followers of these leaders had an intense devotion toward them, often mimicking their idiosyncrasies and promoting them as intellectual gods to their students and colleagues.
These ingroup biases and cohesiveness of these Jewish intellectual movements doubtless account for the success of some of the more egregious politically inspired social science of the last decades. For example, historian John Higham pointed out that the incredible success of the Authoritarian Personality studies (i.e., the studies that analyzed the group allegiances of non-Jews as the result of psychiatric disorder) was facilitated by the “extraordinary ascent” of Jews concerned with anti-Semitism in academic social science departments in the post–World War II era.76

3. Jewish intellectuals had access to the most prestigious academic institutions.
The Jewish-dominated movements that transformed the academic world became ensconced in the most prestigious academic institutions. The New York Intellectuals, for example, developed ties with elite universities, particularly Harvard, Columbia, the University of Chicago, and the University of California–Berkeley, while psychoanalysis and Boasian anthropology became well entrenched throughout academia. The Frankfurt School intellectuals were associated with Columbia and the University of California–Berkeley, and their intellectual descendants are dispersed through the academic world. The neocons are mainly associated with the University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins, and, as noted above, they were able to get their material published by the academic presses at these universities and at Cornell. The moral and intellectual elite established by these movements dominated intellectual discourse during a critical period after World War II and through the transformations of the 1960s. College students during this period were powerfully socialized to adopt liberal-radical cultural and political beliefs.

As Eric P. Kaufmann points out in his account of the general de-cline of WASP America, once the new value set was institutionalized, it became the focus of status competition within the boundaries set by these movements.77
Kaufmann is also useful because, in basic agreement with Gross and Fosse, he cites sociologists Mario Diani
and Doug McAdam who emphasize that social movements tend to succeed to the extent that leaders of a movement
possess “social capital,” in the form of social ties to the mass media, corporate cultural intermediaries, and the state intelligentsia—where dominant interpretations of reality are generated.78

The cosmopolitan revolution was not confined to academia. It came to dominate all the high ground in the society, including the mass media, the political process, and the lower levels of the educational system. In the case of the mass media, there is excellent evidence for a very strong Jewish influence and for the idea that the mass media provided very positive portrayals of the leftist world worldview. In-deed, a major theme of The Culture of Critique is that Jewish influence in the popular media was an important source of favorable coverage of Jewish intellectual movements, particularly psychoanalysis and 1960s political radicalism.

Moreover, as implied by Gross and Fosse, once an organization becomes dominated by a particular intellectual perspective, there is enormous inertia created by the fact that the informal networks domi-nating elite universities serve as gatekeepers for the next generation of scholars. Aspiring academics are subjected to a high level of indoctrination at the undergraduate and graduate levels; there is tremendous psychological pressure to adopt the fundamental intellectual assump-tions that lie at the center of the power hierarchy of the discipline. Once such a movement attains intellectual predominance, it is not surprising that people would attracted to these movements because of the prestige associated with them. And, as Gross and Fosse argue, conservatives who are turned off by these ideas, simply self-select to go into a different line of work.

The final step in the transformation of the university into a stronghold of the anti-White multicultural left was the establishment of academic departments staffed by the various aggrieved parties championed by the multicultural left after it abandoned the White working class. The 1970s saw the emergence of departments of ethnic studies and women’s studies. My university is typical of academia generally in having departments or programs in American Indian Studies, Africana Studies (formerly Black Studies), American Studies (whose sub-ject matter emphasizes “How do diverse groups within the Americas imagine their identities and their relation to the United States?”), Asian and Asian-American Studies, Chicano and Latino Studies, Jewish Studies, and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies.

All of these departments and programs are paragons of the leftist academic culture. All are politically committed to advancing the interests and world views of their special set of victims. Often they are avowedly and explicitly on the
left. For example the Women’s Gender, and Sexuality Studies Department at my university began its statement condemning my work as follows:

The field of Women’s Studies is committed to the creation and promotion of research and teaching that challenges racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia and related bigotries that undermine the possibility for all populations to exist free from discrimination, deprivation, hostility, violence and marginalization. Women’s Studies is dedicated to analyzing and critiquing social institutions that support or promote oppressive conditions against any targeted populations. Informed by feminist method-ology and feminist theory, the core mission of Women’s Studies is to promote positive social transformation that eradicates the full range of bigoted institutions that prevent people from realiz-ing the highest possibilities for their lives.79

A critical force was the Jewish left that came to influence the aca-demic world after World War, reaching a commanding position by the 1960s. These Jewish intellectual movements, particularly the Frankfurt School and the New York Intellectuals, had developed an explicit ideology that promoting the interests of the working class was a poor strategy given that the working class in Europe had not risen up in communist revolution but had joined fascist movements. More-over, as noted above for the New York Intellectuals, they were well aware that race rather than social class was a far more powerful varia-ble for explaining the deeply embedded attitudes of rural America, particularly in the South — attitudes they regarded as abhorrent, at least partly because anti-Jewish attitudes were common among these groups; finally, along with the entire Jewish community, they had adopted a cultural and ethnic pluralist model for America in which America would cease to be defined as either White or Christian.

As a result, the next step was to broaden the basis of the left and consolidate their power by promoting other aggrieved groups — groups with complaints against the traditional people and culture of America. Although it is difficult to specify the exact linkages here, it is certainly the case that the triumph of the Jewish-dominated intellectual movements in the academic world was followed in short order by the establishment of these other pillars of the cultural left within the university. Indeed, as noted throughout Culture of Critique, a common pattern for Jewish intellectual and political movements has been to reach out and make alliances with non-Jews, who often attain highly visible po-sitions in the movement.80

This is necessary because Jews are a rela-tively small percentage of population and cannot dominate academic discourse (or influence the political process) without allies. The culture of the left became solidified within the university when it was able to recruit these other the sexual, racial and ethnic victims who are now such a large and committed portion of the leftist culture of the university.

Further, the Jewish movements that came to dominate the academy are not at all different from the wider Jewish community in making alliances with ethnic and sexual minorities. The organized Jewish community has made alliances with non-White ethnic groups and has championed the cause of public visibility for sexual minorities.81

As Charles Silberman notes, “American Jews are committed to cultural tolerance because of their belief—one firmly rooted in history—that Jews are safe only in a society acceptant of a wide range of attitudes and behaviors, as well as a diversity of religious and ethnic groups. It is this belief, for example, not approval of homosexuality, that leads an overwhelming majority of U.S. Jews to endorse ‘gay rights’ and to take a liberal stance on most other so-called ‘social’ issues.”82

Conspicuously missing from the list of Jewish allies are lower and middle class Whites. These are the groups that were most vilified by the New York Intellectuals and the Frankfurt School, and they have suffered the most by the multicultural revolution.These people are being pushed out economically and politically. They are the enraged participants in the Tea Party movement that is so visible right now. They can’t move to gated communities or send their children to all-White private schools. Their unions have been destroyed and their jobs either shipped overseas or performed by recent immigrants, legal and illegal. Their fortunes will continue to decline as millions more non-Whites crowd our shores. Those among them who wish to become professors will perforce have to turn their backs on the political and economic in-terests their own people.


The result of this revolution is the American university as we see it now. Conservatives need not apply. And heterosexual White males should be prepared to exhibit effusive demonstrations of guilt and sympathy with their oppressed co-workers — and expect to be passed over for high-profile administrative positions in favor of the many aggrieved ethnic and sexual minorities who now dominate the university, particularly in the liberal arts and humanities. These are the areas that define who we are. Quite simply, the results of the revolution of the multicultural left have been a disaster for the traditional people and culture of Europe and all its offshoots.

1 Kevin MacDonald, Department of Psychology, California State University–Long Beach, Long Beach, CA 90840-0901.
2 Neil Gross and Ethan Fosse, “ Why are professors liberal?” Theory and Society, 4 , 127–168, 2012.
3 Jeffrey C. Alexander, The Civil Sphere (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
4 Gross and Fosse, “Why are professors liberal?,” 128.
5 Stanley S. Rothman, Robert Lichter, and Neil Nevitte, “Politics and professional advancement among college faculty.” The Forum 3, article 2 (2005).
6 Gross and Fosse, “Why are professors liberal?,” 145.
7 Gross and Fosse, Ibid. , 154.
8 Gross and Fosse, Ibid. , 155.
9 Kevin MacDonald, “Memories of Madison: My Life in the New Left,” VDARE.com, March 18, 2009. http://www.vdare.com/macdonald/09-318_madison.htm
10 Yoel Inbar and Joris Lammers, “Political diversity in social and personality psychology,” Perspectives in Psychological Science , in press (Sept. 2012).
11 Gross and Fosse, “Why are professors liberal?,” 155.
12 Gross and Fosse, “Why are professors liberal?,” 155.
13 Kevin MacDonald, “Eric P. Kaufmann’s The Rise and Fall of Anglo America, Part II: The Period of Ethnic Defense,” The Occidental Observer , July 29, 2009. http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/articles/MacDonald-KaufmannII.html#ED
14 Kevin MacDonald, “Review of Thomas Wheatland’s The Frankfurt School in Exile, Part I: Authoritarianism and the Family,”
The Occidental Observer, October 19, 2009. http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/articles/MacDonald-WheatlandI.html
15 Gross and Fosse, “Why are professors liberal?,” 158–159.
16 Eric P. Kaufmann, The Rise and Fall of Anglo America (Harvard University Press, 2004), 191.
17 Kevin MacDonald: The Israel Lobby: A Case Study of Jewish Influence. The Occidental Quarterly, 7(3) (2007) 33–58.
18 Ullica Segersträle, Defenders of the Truth: The Sociobiology Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
19 Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in 20th-century Intellectual an
d Political Movements (New Haven: Praeger, 1998).
20 E. O. Wilson, Naturalist (Harvard University Press, 1991), 344.
21 MacDonald, The Culture of Critique, Ibid.
22 Scott Frickel and Neil Gross, “A General Theory of Scientific/Intellectual Movements,” American Sociological Review, 70 (2005): 204–232.
23 Jack H. Schuster and Martin J. Finkelstein, The American Faculty: The Restructuring of Work and Careers (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).
24 David A. Hollinger, Science, Jews, and Secular Culture: Studies in Mid-Twentieth-Century American Intellectual History
(Princeton University Press, 1996), 160.
25 Hollinger, Science, Jews, and Secular Culture, 4
26 George W. Stocking, Race, Evolution, and Culture: Essays in the History of Anthropology (New York: Free Press), 265.
27 Melville J. Herskovits, Franz Boas (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons), 23.
28 Irving Louis Horowitz, The Decomposition of Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press 1993), 77.
29 Howard M. Sachar, A History of Jews in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 804.
30 Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians, and the New Left. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 104–105.
31 Rothman and Lichter, Roots of Radicalism , 104–105.
32 Norman Podhoretz, Why Are Jews Liberals? (New York: Doubleday, 2009).
33 Kevin MacDonald, Separation and Its Discontents (New Haven: Praeger, 1998), 178-179.
34 Podhoretz, Why Are Jews Liberals, 29.
35 Ibid., 43.
36 Ibid., 51.
37 Ibid., 111.
38 Ibid., 108.
39 Ibid., 90.
40 John Murray Cuddihy, The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss, and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity (New York: Basic Books), 68.
41 Carl Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 200; Stocking, Race, Evolution, and Culture, 150.
42 Charles Liebman, The Ambivalent American Jew: Politics, Religion, and Family in American Jewish Life (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1991), 153ff.
43 Liebman, The Ambivalent American Jew, 153.
44 Liebman, The Ambivalent American Jew, 157.
45 Y. H. Yerushalmi, Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable (Yale University Press), 39.
46 Dennis B. Klein, Jewish Origins of the Psychoanalytic Movement (New York: Praeger, 1987), 86.
47 Freud quoted in Peter Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time (New York: W.W. Norton), 231.
48 Clement Greenberg, “The Pound award,” Partisan Review, 16 (1949), 515–516, 515; italics in text).
49 Sidney Hook, “Reflections on the Jewish question,” Partisan Review, 16 (1949), 463–482, 468.
50 Ibid., 471–472.
51 Terry A. Cooney, The Rise of the New York Intellectuals: Partisan Review and Its Circle (University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), 267–268.)
52 Earl Raab, “Can antisemitism disappear?” In Antisemitism in America Today: Outspoken Experts Explode the Myths, ed. J. A. Chanes (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1995), 91.
53 Sachar, A History of Jews in America, 427.
54 Degler, In Search of Human Nature, 74.
55 John Higham, Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America, rev. ed. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 58–59.
56 See Pat Shipman, The Evolution of Racism: Human Differences and the Use and Abuse of Science (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 159ff.
57 Oscar Handlin, “The immigration fight has only begun,”Commentary, 14(July, 1952), 1–7, 5. MacDonald, “Why are Professors Liberal?” 22
58 Max Lerner, America as a Civilization: Life and Thought in the United States Today (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1957), 502, 504.
59 Kevin MacDonald, “Neoconservatism as a Jewish Movement,” The Occidental Quarterly, 4(2) (Summer, 2004).
60 Michael Gerson, “Security and freedom: Making the world safe with Ronald Reagan.” In Michael Gerson (ed.), The Essential Neoconservative Reader (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), 161–162.
61 Ruth Wisse, “The delegitimation of Israel,” Commentary (October, 1981). Reprinted in Gerson (ed.), The Essential Neoconservative Reader), 192.
62 Stephen P. Powers, David J. Rothman, and Stanley Rothman, Hollywood’s America: Political Themes in Motion Pictures
(Denver, CO: Westview Press, 1996).
63 Steven M. Cohen & Charles S. Liebman, “American Jewish liberalism: Unraveling the strands,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 61 (1997), 405–430. MacDonald, “Why are Professors Liberal?” 242. Jewish intellectuals formed cohesive, effective networks
64 Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique (New Haven: Praeger, 1998), 215.
65 Florence Rubenfeld, Clement Greenberg: A Life (New York: Scribner, 1998), 97.
66 Michael Wrezin, A Rebel in Defense of Tradition: The Life and Politics of Dwight Macdonald (New York: Basic Books), 33.
MacDonald, “Why Are Professors Liberal?” 25
67 Norman Podhoretz, Making It (New York: Random House. 1961), 115–116, 151; italics in text.
68 Paul Gottfried, The Conservative Movement, rev. ed. (New York: Twayne Pub-lishers, 1993), 73.
69 Cooney, The Rise of the New York Intellectuals, 265.
70 Ibid.249.
71 Alan M. Wald, The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930s to the 1980s
(The University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 12, 10
72 A. G. Greenwald and E. S. Schuh, “An ethnic bias in scientific citations,” European Journal of Social Psychology,24 (1994), 623–639.
73 Charles Kadushin, The American Intellectual Elite (Boston: Little, Brown, 2005)
74 E. S. Shapiro, “Jewishness and the New York intellectuals,” Judaism, 38 (1989), 282–292.
75 E. Fuller Torrey, Freudian Fraud: The Malignant Effect of Freud’s Theory on American Thought and Culture (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). MacDonald, “Why Are Professors Liberal?” 27
of the Authoritarian Personality studies (i.e., the studies that analyzed the group allegiances of non-Jews as the result of psychiatric disorder) was facilitated by the “extraordinary ascent” of Jews concerned with anti-Semitism in academic social science departments in the post–World War II era.
76 Highan, Send These To Me, 154)
77 Kaufmann, The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America, 247.
78 Mario Diani, “Social Movements and Social Capital: A Network Perspective on Movement Outcomes,” Mobilization: An Inte
rnational Quarterly, 2(2) (1997), 129–147.
MacDonald, “Why are Professors Liberal?” 28
80 See also MacDonald, “Neoconservatism as a Jewish movement.”
81 Kevin MacDonald, “Jews, Blacks and Race.” In Samuel Francis (ed.) Race and the American Prospect (Atlanta, GA: The Occidental Press, 2006); Kevin Mac-Donald, “The ADL: Managing White Rage,” The Occidental Observer, December 7, 2009.
82 Charles E. Silberman, A Certain People: American Jews and Their Lives Today(New York: Summit Books, 1985), 350. MacDonald, “Why Are Professors Liberal?” 31